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AN ALMOST ARCHEOLOGICAL DIG:
FINDING A SURPRISINGLY RICH
EARLY UNDERSTANDING
OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS*
Louise Weinberg**
There exists a hitherto unnoticed early disquisition on
substantive due process, setting out in 1840 a theory of
substantive due process far more powerful than the bare-bones
concept Chief Justice Taney would deploy seventeen years later
in Dred Scott. This remarkable text has languished in obscurity
until now because it is layered over and threaded through with
matters extraneous to it. It exists buried within the report of an
1
oral argument about a different question, in a case, Holmes v.
2
3
Jennison, about a wholly unrelated problem. The ancient relic
has now been unearthed, in an almost archeological dig, by
separating its fragments from the layered deposit in which it is
submerged, as if lifting the clay from a potsherd.
4
With a single exception, a 1993 paper on the Ninth
Amendment, I have found no mention of this old argument of
counsel in books or articles or cases. There appears to be no
quotation or excerpt from it. As far as the Tarlton Law Library,
Westlaw, or Google can discover—apart from the exception
noted—the argument has no existence beyond the official
reports of the case in which it appeared. And in the 1993 paper
in which this argument of counsel is mentioned, there is no
* Copyright © 2010 by Louise Weinberg.
** Holder of the Bates Chair and Professor of Law, The University of Texas
School of Law.
1. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 555–57 (1840) (Cornelius P. Van Ness
for the plaintiff in error) (arguing that the protections of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause should be read to apply to the states as well as the nation).
2. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540.
3. Id. at 569 (Taney, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (holding that the treaty power is
exclusively federal).
4. John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 1004
(1993) (referring to the view of the Ninth Amendment argued by Cornelius P. Van Ness
for the plaintiff in error in Jennison).
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recognition of the existence of the surprisingly rich theory of due
process discoverable within it.
The fons et origo of substantive due process is commonly
5
6
supposed to be Dred Scott, the first Supreme Court case to
strike down an act of Congress on a substantive due process
ground. But scholarly examination of antebellum case law has
shown that at least a skeletal concept of substantive due process,
as it appears in Dred Scott, was already familiar at the time Dred
7
Scott was decided. Lawyers and judges understood, then as now,
the half-substantive, half-procedural point that due process
requires reasonable law. Arbitrary or irrational law is not due
8
process. Nor may good law be applied unreasonably, either by
9
officials or judges. Nor may officials take other arbitrary or
irrational action. Such acts or laws are not the process that is
10
due.
But writers have found little, if any, early intimation that
due process was thought to protect fundamental rights. Where in
5. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 39, 44 (1997).
6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
7. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 117
(1995); Louise Weinberg, Overcoming Dred, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 733, 745–46 (2007);
James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 319 (1999).
8. Thus, law that is duly enacted may nevertheless not be due process. Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852) (Taney, C.J.) (stating that patent
legislation depriving the plaintiff of existing property could not be due process). See also,
e.g., Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 383 (N.Y. 1838) (stating the rule that the state
may not deprive anyone “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; i.e., by
mere arbitrary legislation”).
9. See the 1815 argument of counsel in United States v. Bryan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
374, 378 (1815): “[A creditor] ought to have full reason to rely that . . . [a] subsequent
enactment . . . [would not] enhance his risk of danger beyond what it was when the debt
was contracted. Such a mode of legislation . . . would be virtually taking away private
‘property’ without ‘due process of law.’ . . . [It] could not have been ‘necessary and
proper;’ and is not warranted by the constitution.” (emphases in original). Today we also
understand that law may not be chosen arbitrarily. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion), reh’g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981), and cases there
cited (requiring rational choices of law as between states, under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
(requiring rational choices of law as between nation and state, explaining that Congress
lacks power to make state law). For the argument that the Due Process Clauses provide
unified theory for both sorts of cases, see Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New
General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523 (2004); Louise Weinberg, The FederalState Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743 (1992); Louise
Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989); Louise Weinberg
Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982).
10. Cf. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that the Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used
to implement them.”).
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our early cases can we find an understanding that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects fundamental,
substantive liberties? Liberties not enumerated in the Bill of
Rights?
To be sure, Dred Scott’s due process might be read to have
protected liberty as well as property, specifically implicating a
right to travel. Taney declared, referring to the Fifth
Amendment, that a law that has the effect of destroying a man’s
property, merely because he travels with his property to a place
at which such property has been abolished by law, cannot be due
11
process. But Taney’s was hardly an encompassing vision of
fundamental unenumerated rights. Nothing in his terse
pronouncement protecting property from confiscation by action
of law necessarily implied specific protection even for property
rights already mentioned in the Bill of Rights. (Today, of course,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment literally
does protect against state violations of rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights, by “incorporating” them.) Rather, Taney was
saying, in line with the most expansive general understandings of
the time, that due process substantively protects against law that
is arbitrary and unreasonable. Dred Scott’s protection against
unreasonable law also did not necessarily imply protection
against violation of rights which, like the right to travel, are not
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but which may be as
fundamental as those that are.
Yet identifiable fundamental rights, although unenumerated, would seem to call for judicial protection. The Ninth
Amendment acknowledges the existence of such rights and
cautions that the Constitution not be construed in disparagement
or in derogation of them. In the antebellum period,
unenumerated rights—rights to marry, to have children, to seek
gainful employment, to have access to courts, and so forth—
were sometimes assigned to a category of unalienable rights
antedating the Constitution, the existence of which is
12
acknowledged in the Declaration of Independence. Or they
11. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450: (“And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of
the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought
his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of
law.”).
12. For a modern acknowledgement of this antique position, see Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting): (“In my view, a right of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children is among the ‘unalienable Rights’ with which
the Declaration of Independence proclaims ‘all men . . . are endowed by their

!!!WEINBERG-271-ANALMOSTARCHEOLOGICALDIG.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

12/17/2010 3:46 PM

166

[Vol. 27:163

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

were conceived as essential attributes or privileges of state
13
citizenship. This latter understanding, as regards United States
citizenship, appears in Dred Scott, but not in its holding striking
down an act of Congress. Rather, it appears in the passages in
Dred Scott rejecting black rights by denying the possibility of
14
black citizenship. In Chief Justice Taney’s admired early
opinion in the Charles River Bridge case, a suggestion of
substantive due process appears when he launches his Contracts
15
Clause analysis with Magna Carta and the Due Process Clause.
But until now, we have not found an antebellum discussion of
substantive due process in the potent sense in which we
understand the doctrine today. We have not found due process
asserted in protection of unenumerated fundamental rights, not
in that early period. The interest of the edited argument from
Holmes v. Jennison, reproduced below, resides in the fact that it
does seem to embody, as early as 1840, something like the
modern, if still contested position, as it has developed since
16
Meyer v. Nebraska, that due process protects unenumerated
fundamental rights.
Greatly complicating the discovery of this find is the fact
17
that counsel making the argument, Governor Van Ness, was
not, in his own mind, making a substantive due process
argument. Articulating a theory of substantive due process was
not the end he had in view. His argument was not focused on the
proposition that the Due Process Clause is substantive as well as
procedural. He was not focused on making the points that in fact
he did make: that the Due Process Clause is not only a limit on
government power, and not only a shield against arbitrary
Creator.’ . . . The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription
conferring powers upon the courts. . . .”).
13. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.Pa. 1823). In the cited passage,
Justice Bushrod Washington, sitting on a circuit, listed certain property and civic rights as
examples of privileges and immunities of citizenship within the meaning of Article IV.
That Article, which touches upon the states, provides in its second section that “[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.” U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2.
14. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410 passim; id. at 411 (declaring that the Constitution was
not intended to confer on black persons “or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or any
of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen”).
15. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
420, 648–50 (1837).
16. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding in part that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the family from unreasonable state interference in the
rearing of its children) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
17. This was Cornelius P. Van Ness (1782-1852), who had been Governor of
Vermont from 1823-1826.
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governance, but also a positive protection of fundamental
human rights. The original unedited passage from Van Ness’s
argument, which can be read in the Appendix, was about
something else, and, understandably, no previous commentator
has considered it in its possible bearing on the history of
substantive due process theory. All that Van Ness did mean to
argue in this passage was that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment should be applied against the states as well as
the nation. This proposal was bold enough, a quarter-century
before the Fourteenth Amendment’s own Due Process Clause.
And the Fourteenth Amendment was the hard-won fruit of civil
war and military occupation. Chief Justice Taney did not deign
to respond to the suggestion. Justice Barbour simply noted his
belief that this point, “urged at the bar,” was controlled by
18
Barron v. Baltimore.
Nevertheless, from Van Ness’s original text we can extract
and bring to light an early conception of a richly substantive due
19
process, apparently unique for its time. What emerges, and is
reprinted immediately below, may be the most detailed and
impassioned early statement of substantive due process theory
we have. It develops in extenso a theory of a substantive due
process that, within an over-arching concept of personal liberty,
protects principles—unenumerated and fundamental rights—
which lie at the foundation of that liberty. These rights are
acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment. And in this
understanding, the Due Process Clause imposes affirmative
duties on the nation to protect those liberties. What we have
here, then, is a fully realized early expression of substantive due
process virtually as it would emerge in the Supreme Court in the
twentieth century, eventually bestowing upon the most intimate
private human acts, relations, and choices a long hoped-for
freedom from government interference. In some ways the
argument presented below goes beyond even these understandings.

18. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding that the rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights were protections against national, not state action).
19. For perhaps the narrowest procedural antebellum understanding of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION 709–10 (Story abridgment, 1833) (describing the Due Process Clause as
protecting against forfeiture of life, liberty, or property on “general warrants”).
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EDITED EXTRACT

20

CORNELIUS P. VAN NESS
ARGUMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR
HOLMES V. JENNISON (1840)21
We have now arrived at the third and last point;
which is, . . . [whether] the act now complained of
was . . . a violation of the provision in the Constitution
of the United States which declares that ‘no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.’
...
. . . When we speak of a limitation of power, we
have naturally in view some power which, without such
limitation, might be lawfully exercised; and of this
character are the prohibitions in the original
Constitution, whether relating to the general
government, or to the states. That some of the
amendments are of the same character is
unquestionably true. But there are others which are not
so; among which is the one containing the clause
declaring that ‘no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ These
latter cannot be considered as limitations of power, but
are to be understood as declarations of rights. Of
absolute rights, inherent in the people, and of which no
power can legally deprive them.
The right of personal liberty has existed ever since
the first creation of man, and is incident to his nature.
It has been recognized from the earliest organization of
society, and the first institution of civil government,
until the present time. And for the plain reason that
this sacred right is beyond the reach of all legitimate
power, it cannot properly be the subject of a limitation
20. Ellipses indicate omissions; brackets indicate summary insertions.
21. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 555–57.
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to the action of a regular government. . . . The
declaration of this right, as well as of others, was made
a part of the Constitution of the United States . . . . We
find it there, and the only question now is, as to the
extent of its operation.
That the clause in question (and indeed the whole
article in which it appears) embraces every person
within the limits and jurisdiction of the whole Union,
will not be denied. . . .
...
It may with truth be affirmed, that most of the
amendments to the Constitution contain principles
which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty, and are
most intimately connected with the dearest rights of the
people. Principles which should be cherished and
enforced by a just and parental government, to the
utmost extent of its authority. Principles which, in
reality, like those proclaimed from the burning mount,
deserve to be diligently taught to our children, and to
be written upon the posts of the houses, and upon the
gates.
...
But the distinction which I have endeavored to
establish between the limitations of power and the
declarations of rights, is adopted in the clearest manner
in the Constitution itself. The ninth article of the
amendments declares, that ‘the enumeration in the
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.’ And
the tenth article provides, that ‘the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people.’ Here we see that the
framers of these amendments had no ideal of
confounding the limitations of power, and the
declarations of rights; but treated each as distinct from
the other. . . . [T]he ninth article was deemed necessary
as it regarded the rights declared to exist, in order to
prevent the people from being deprived of others by
implication, that might not be included in the
enumeration.

169
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It appears clear to my mind, then, that the
provision in the Constitution to which I have referred,
instead of limiting the powers of the general
government, directly calls into action those powers for
the protection of . . . the great and fundamental right of
personal liberty.
_____________
Here we have a powerful recognition of fundamental but
unenumerated human rights, rights of personal liberty, within a
substantive vision of the concept of due process of law. These
are affirmative rights, not simply limits on government power.
Moreover, these rights require active government protection;
and their existence is acknowledged by the Ninth Amendment.
Judicial review of laws and other official acts, in this
understanding, would be required in order that government not
be permitted to violate these rights. That the unedited argument
in the Appendix is actually about something else can hardly be
said to alter the substantive understanding of the Due Process
Clause that informs it.
But a caveat is in order. Although this once-buried passage
seems a beacon of liberty, in the antebellum period it would
have been—to mix a metaphor—a two-edged sword. What if
22
Chief Justice Taney had taken up the argument? Taney would
hardly have been troubled by Van Ness’s insistence that the Due
Process Clause “embraces every person within the limits and
jurisdiction of the whole Union; we know that in Dred Scott
Taney would read the Declaration of Independence’s “All men
23
are created equal” as excluding blacks. Van Ness’s point, that
the Fifth Amendment should protect the personal liberties of
individuals from state as well as federal interference, if taken up
by Taney in Jennison, would have become available in the future
to extend the Fifth Amendment rationale of Dred Scott to the
states’ own legislatures, within the states’ own borders. And
insofar as Dred Scott’s Fifth Amendment would protect liberty,
it would only be the liberty of slave masters to travel into free
federal territory without losing their slave “property.” Dred
Scott’s Fifth Amendment protected slavery, not liberty.

22. See generally Louise Weinberg, Overcoming Dred: A Counterfactual Analysis,
24 CONST. COMMENT. 733 (2007).
23. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410.
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As constitutional law, of course, Dred Scott made its
protection of slavery operative within the states, but only as
against federal interference. Abraham Lincoln warned after
Dred Scott that it would take just one more Taney Court
decision to force slavery upon the free states, protecting
“property” in human beings even from interference by a free
24
state’s own legislature within the free state’s own borders. Had
Taney adopted Van Ness’s invitation to extend the Fifth
Amendment to the states, that next case after Dred Scott would
have been all but decided, the plurality opinion in Jennison
serving as convenient, perhaps controlling precedent. And the
states, as Lincoln feared, would have been stripped of power to
prohibit slavery on their own territory.
The affirmative duty of protection to which Van Ness would
summon Congress is equally troubling in the context of the
antebellum period. It finds an echo in the extremist demand of
the Deep South faction at the first Democratic convention in
25
1860 that Congress enact a national slave code. Had Taney
given authoritative voice to Van Ness’s argument, Jennison
could have undergirded future Supreme Court validation of that
national slave code. This was the demand that broke up the
26
Democratic Party in 1860, ushering in Lincoln’s election and
the crisis that followed.
To appreciate and honor the words in this newly-discovered
passage, while understanding the unique dangers they presented
in their time—that is the claim this now-revealed, quite
wonderful exposition makes upon the liberal mind.

24. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, “A House Divided,” (June
16, 1858), in CREATED EQUAL?: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF
1858, at 1, 7 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958).
25. For the development of the Southern demand for a national slave code, see
ERIC H. WALTHER, WILLIAM LOWNDES YANCEY AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR
(2006); JOSEPH HODGSON, THE CRADLE OF THE CONFEDERACY (photo. reprint 2005)
(1876); Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 97,
125–31 (2007).
26. OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION,
HELD IN 1860, AT CHARLESTON AND BALTIMORE, at 59, 65 passim (photo. reprint 2005)
(John Gibson Parkhurst ed., 1860).
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APPENDIX
UNEDITED EXCERPT27
CORNELIUS P. VAN NESS
ARGUMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR
HOLMES V. JENNISON (1840)28
We have now arrived at the third and last point; which is,
that admitting a state to possess the right to act upon the subject
of surrendering to foreign governments fugitives from justice,
yet that the sovereign power of the state must be brought into
action, and the surrenders made under a regular law or
proceeding of such power; and that as [whether] the act now
complained of was without any such authority, it was a violation
of the provision in the Constitution of the United States which
declares that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.’
But here arises the question, whether this provision in the
Constitution is applicable to the states; or, in other words,
whether it constitutes a protection against the unlawful exercise
of state power. I am aware that it has been decided by this
Court, in the case of Barron vs. The City of Baltimore, 7 Peters,
243, that the amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, commonly called the bill of rights, were simply limitations
of the powers of the general government, and had no effect upon
the state governments. But as the decision is a recent one, and
stands alone, I trust the Court will attend to me while I submit a
few remarks upon a question so important and interesting.
Let me begin by observing that the rule of construction
which can generally be resorted to, in order to determine the
sense of any provision in the original Constitution, cannot be
applied to the articles of amendment. The Constitution itself was

27. The theory of substantive due process extracted in the foregoing paper from
this original text is underlined. Brackets indicate summary or orthographical insertions
made in the edited extract.
28. Jennison, 39 U.S. at 555–57.
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one connected work, and was the result (if I may be allowed the
expression) of a concentration of mind; and in deciding upon
one part of it, reference may be had to other parts, and the
whole so construed as consistently to stand together. But the
case is very different as it regards the amendments. These have
little or no connection with each other, varying both in their
character and in their terms, and were originally proposed from
different quarters, and with different objects. Each article,
therefore, if not each clause, should be construed simply
according to its own nature, and the terms in which it may be
expressed.
With the utmost deference I beg leave to observe, that in
my humble judgment, an error was committed by the Court, in
the case referred to, in supposing all the articles of amendment
to be in the nature of limitations of governmental power, or to
have been so intended at the time of their adoption. When we
speak of a limitation of power, we have naturally in view some
power which, without such limitation, might be lawfully
exercised; and of this character are the prohibitions in the
original Constitution, whether relating to the general
government, or to the states. That some of the amendments are
of the same character is unquestionably true. But there are
others which are not so; among which is the one containing the
clause declaring that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.’ These latter cannot be
considered as limitations of power, but are to be understood as
declarations of rights. Of absolute rights, inherent in the people,
and of which no power can legally deprive them.
The right of personal liberty has existed ever since the first
creation of man, and is incident to his nature. It has been
recognised from the earliest organization of society, and the first
institution of civil government, until the present time. And for
the plain reason that this sacred right is beyond the reach of all
legitimate power, it cannot properly be the subject of a
limitation to the action of a regular government. Whether [T]he
declaration of this right, as well as of others, was made a part of
the Constitution of the United States, with a view, principally, of
guarding it from violations by the general government, it is not
material to inquire. We find it there, and the only question now
is, as to the extent of its operation.
That the clause in question (and indeed the whole article in
which it appears) embraces every person within the limits and
jurisdiction of the whole Union, will not be denied. All that
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remains to be determined is, whether it is to be construed as
leaving the states free to encroach upon the right which it
declares every one shall enjoy; or whether it is to be understood
as recognising and adopting the principle that no power from
any quarter can do so. In other words, whether the clause was
inserted because it was deemed more proper for the states than
for the general government to deprive a person of his life or
liberty without law; or, whether, to promulgate a general
command against the violation of a right possessed by a title
above all legitimate governmental power.
If it should be supposed that in forming the Constitution, no
protection was wanted from the general government against the
illegal exercise of state power, the answer is, that this, though
generally true, is by no means universally so. There are several
restrictions upon the states in the Constitution, for the benefit
and security of the people; and that, too, where the same powers
are prohibited to the general government. One, for example, is,
that no state shall pass ex post facto laws. And this is for the
reason that no person ought to be punished by any government,
for an act made criminal after the fact. Yet surely this principle is
not more worthy of being guarded by the general government,
than that a person shall not be twice punished for the same
offence; or that he shall not be deprived of his life or liberty,
except by due course of law. But we find that the United States
stand pledged in the Constitution to guaranty to every state in
the Union a republican form of government, and to protect each
of them against domestic violence; thus becoming directly and
deeply interested that state power shall not be unlawfully or
improperly exercised.
It may with truth be affirmed, that most of the amendments
to the Constitution contain principles which lie at the very
foundation of civil liberty, and are most intimately connected
with the dearest rights of the people. Principles which should be
cherished and enforced by a just and parental government, to
the utmost extent of its authority. Principles which, in reality,
like those proclaimed from the burning mount, deserve to be
diligently taught to our children, and to be written upon the
posts of the houses, and upon the gates.
It is true, that most of the states have incorporated into their
constitutions the same principles; though several of those
instruments do not contain the important provision relied upon
in this case. But this furnishes no argument against allowing
them the force in the Constitution of the United States for which
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I contend. Some of the state constitutions also contain the
prohibition against passing ex post facto laws; but does this
weaken the authority of the same restriction upon the states in
the general Constitution? And is it not, moreover, very proper,
that the state constitutions should themselves embrace all the
provisions necessary to a good government, whether they are
needed for the present, or not; since it cannot be foreseen what
further amendments or alterations may take place in the
Constitution of the United States.
But the distinction which I have endeavoured to establish
between the limitations of power and the declarations of rights,
is adopted in the clearest manner in the Constitution itself. The
ninth article of the amendments declares, that ‘the enumeration
in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.’ And the tenth
article provides, that ‘the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.’ Here we see
that the framers of these amendments had no idea of
confounding the limitations of power, and the declarations of
rights; but treated each as distinct from the other. If the
amendments had treated only of the former, certainly the
reservation, both to the states and to the people, in the tenth
article, would have answered every purpose. But [T]he ninth
article was deemed necessary as it regarded the rights declared
to exist, in order to prevent the people from being deprived of
others by implication, that might not be included in the
enumeration.
It appears clear to my mind, then, that the provision in the
Constitution to which I have referred, instead of limiting the
powers of the general government, directly calls into action
those powers for the protection of the citizen. That it forms a
part of the supreme law of the land, by which all the authorities
of the states, as well as those of the Union, are bound. And that
the establishment of the contrary doctrine would essentially
weaken the security of the people; since it would leave without
the protection of the paramount and superintending power of
the Union, the great and fundamental right of personal liberty.

